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Foisy v. Wyman, 83 Wash. 2d 22,
515 P.2d 160 (1973).
The common-law rule, still followed in the majority of juris-
dictions, is that unless a lease involves the rental of a furnished
dwelling for a very short duration,1 there is no implied warranty
that the rented premises are habitable and generally fit for the ten-
ant to live in.2 The rule has been expressly predicated on the fa-
miliar doctrine of caveat emptor 3 and implicitly predicated on a
number of agrarian leasehold assumptions. 4 Commentators have
vigorously attacked the rule and have urged its replacement by an
implied warranty of habitability.5 Quite recently, a rapidly in-
creasing number of jurisdictions have re-examined this much-dis-
liked common-law rule and have overturned it in favor of one
1. The leading decision setting forth this short-term, furnished dwelling
exception is Ingalls v. Hobbs, 156 Mass. 348, 31 N.E. 286 (1892). The
Ingalls court reasoned that because the tenant is renting the furnished
dwelling for only a very short duration, both parties reasonably con-
template that the tenant will expect a dwelling which he will not have
to spend time repairing.
2. 2 R. POWELL, LAW OF REAL PROPERTY 233 (1973 ed.).
3. See e.g., Bennett v. Sullivan, 100 Me. 118, 60 A. 886 (1905).
4. First, the land and not the dwelling was considered by the agrarian
tenant to be the most important part of the leasehold. Second, the
common-law tenant was a "jack-of-all-trades" farmer who could eas-
ily make the necessary repairs himself. Third, placing the duty of re-
pair on the shoulders of the agrarian tenant was justified because he
usually remained on one piece of land his entire life. Javins v. First
Nat'l Realty Corp., 428 F.2d 1071 (D.C. Cir. 1970); Mease v. Fox, 200
N.W.2d 791 (Iowa 1972); Lemle v. Breeden, 51 Hawaii 426, 462 P.2d
470 (1969).
5. See Quinn & Phillips, The Law of Landlord-Tenant: A Critical Evalu-
ation of the Past With Guidelines for the Future, 38 FOIDHAM L. REV.
225 (1969); Skillern, Implied Warranties in Leases: The Need for
Change, 44 DENVER L.J. 387 (1967); Comment, Implied Warranty of
Habitability: An Incipient Trend in the Law of Landlord-Tenant?, 40
FORDHAm L. REV. 123 (1971).
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which provides that in every urban residential lease agreement
there is an implied warranty that the rented premises are habit-
able.6
Because the implied warranty of habitability is in its initial
stages of development, its parameters have yet to be determined by
the courts. In Foisy v. Wyman , 7 the Washington Supreme Court
joined this growing group of minority jurisdictions in overturning
its common-law rule and implying a warranty of habitability in
lease agreements. Foisy raises an important new aspect of this de-
veloping doctrine. Specifically, does a tenant waive the protection
of an implied warranty of habitability where he accepts premises
6. Eleven jurisdictions have fully endorsed the implied warranty of hab-
itability: Javins v. First Nat'l Realty Corp., 428 F.2d 1071 (D.C. Cir.
1970); Green v. Superior Court, 10 Cal. 3d 616, 517 P.2d 1168, 111 Cal.
Rptr. 704 (1974); Steele v. Latimer, - Kan. -, 521 P.2d 304 (1974);
Foisy v. Wyman, 83 Wash. 2d 22, 515 P.2d 160 (1973); Boston Housing
Authority v. Hemmingway, 293 N.E.2d 831 (Mass. 1973); King v.
Moorehead, 495 S.W.2d 65 (Mo. App. 1973); Mease v. Fox, 200 N.W.2d
791 (Iowa 1972); Jack Spring, Inc. v. Little, 50 IIL 2d 351, 280 N.E.2d
208 (1972); Kline v. Burns, 111 N.H. 87, 276 A.2d 248 (1971); Marini
v. Ireland, 56 N.J. 130, 265 A.2d 526 (1970); Lemle v. Breeden, 51
Hawaii 426, 462 P.2d 470 (1969).
It should be noted that the courts are far from uniform in their
rationale for implying the warranty of habitability. Some courts have
rested the warranty entirely upon a change in the basic assumptions
underlying the common law rule, while others have reasoned that it
is implied from the provisions of local housing codes. Still others have
predicated the implied warranty on both of these grounds.
While Nebraska has not judicially created an implied warranty of
habitability, the overall effect of the Uniform Residential Landlord-
Tenant Act which was recently adopted in Nebraska, L.B. 293, [1974]
Neb. Laws 2d Sess. 88, appears to be that a landlord does impliediy
warrant to his tenant that the rented premises are habitable. This
conclusion is based on a total reading of the act. Section 7 of the act
expressly provides that its provisions shall determine the rights and
obligations of every party to a rental agreement. Section 19 of the
act, in particular, requires that every tenant provide and maintain hab-
itable premises for his tenant. Finally, under section 25 of the act if
the landlord fails to provide and maintain habitable premises for his
tenant, the tenant has three remedies at his disposal: (1) in certain
circumstances he can terminate the lease if the landlord fails to repair
the defects, (2) he can sue for damages, measured by the difference
in the rent paid and the actual fair market value of the defective
premises or (3) he can obtain injunctive relief against the landlord
for any non-compliance. This, in substance, is nothing less than an
implied warranty of habitability. It is important to note that if the
act does, by its terms, create an implied warranty of habitability, then
it apparently cannot be waived by the tenant. Section 15 would ap-
pear to prohibit such a waiver.
7. 43 Wash. 2d 22, 515 P.2d 160 (1973).
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containing substantial patent defects, and where he does so in re-
turn for a reduced monthly rent payment? This note will examine
this issue and the court's treatment of it.
The facts of the case were partially disputed. The landlord
claimed the tenant was possessing the single family dwelling under
an oral six month lease and had an option to purchase the house.
The tenant claimed he was a purchaser and was not renting the
house as the landlord claimed. The court resolved the issue in fa-
vor of the landlord, holding that there was a landlord-tenant rela-
tionship created and not that of vendor-vendee. 8 It was uncontro-
verted that there were a number of major defects on the premises,
including a lack of heat, no hot water tank, broken windows, a
broken door, a defective and leaking toilet, and termites in the base-
ment. It was also admitted that when the tenant accepted the
premises, he was aware of some but not all of these defects. Fur-
ther, although the landlord originally wanted a rent payment of $87
per month, the tenant offered to pay $50 per month, and the land-
lord accepted this offer.
During the six month term, the tenant paid the landlord only
$95, leaving $205 still owing. The tenant remained in possession
after the expiration of the six month term, and the landlord served
him with a notice to pay the rent or vacate the premises. When the
tenant refused to do either, the landlord brought an unlawful de-
tainer action, and the tenant defended by asserting that the landlord
had breached an implied warranty of habitability. The trial court
held for the landlord and refused to allow the tenant to offer evi-
dence supporting his implied warranty of habitability defense. In
a 6-3 decision, the Washington Supreme Court reversed, holding
that there is to be a warranty of habitability implied into urban res-
idential leases and that a breach of that warranty can be raised
by a tenant in an unlawful detainer action.9 Moreover, the court
8. Since the court dealt with Wyman strictly as a tenant and not as a
purchaser, this note will analyze the case entirely from that perspec-
tive. For a discussion of the emerging doctrine of implied warranty
of fitness in the vendor-vendee situation, see Roberts, The Case of the
Unwary Home Buyer: The Housing Merchant Did It, 52 CoumvL L.Q.
835 (1967).
9. In an unlawful detainer action, the sole issue before the court is who
is entitled to possession of the premises. Therefore, the only defenses
permitted to be raised by a tenant are those relating solely to the right
of possession. Since under common law the covenants in a lease are
viewed as being independent, a landlord's breach of the implied war-
ranty of habitability would not be relevant to the issue of possession
because the tenant's duty to pay rent is in no way dependent on the
landlord's duty to provide habitable premises. Hence, the breach
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ruled that regardless of the tenant's acceptance of the premises
containing patent defects and despite his insistence that the
monthly rent payments be reduced from $87 to $50, he could not be
deemed to have waived the protection of the implied warranty and
could assert its breach as a defense to the landlord's action.'0
Set against the background of other decisions in this area, as
well as the treatment given the warranties implied under the Uni-
form Commercial Code, it may appear that the Foisy court has gone
too far in affording the instant tenant the protection of the implied
warranty. Prior to Foisy, the decisions in this area framed the im-
plied warranty largely as a warranty against latent defects only."
Thus, if a dwelling contains patent defects but a tenant nonetheless
accepts it, these decisions indicate that the tenant has waived the
protection of the implied warranty.' 2 Such an approach to the im-
could not be raised as a defense. However, the modern view, followed
by Foisy, is that a lease is essentially a contractual relationship em-
bodying covenants which are mutually dependent and that a breach
of a covenant by the landlord may be raised by the tenant in an un-
lawful detainer action, so long as it otherwise relates to the issue of
possession. Foisy ruled that a breach of the implied warranty of hab-
itability does directly relate to possession and may be raised in an
unlawful detainer action. This same conclusion was promulgated in
Green v. City of San Francisco, 10 Cal. 3d 616, 517 P.2d 1168, 111 Cal.
Rptr. 704 (1974).
10. The remedy afforded the tenant by the Foisy court for a breach of
the implied warranty was an extinguishment of the monthly rent to
that sum representing the actual value of the leased premises. But
even with this remedy, the instant case demonstrates that a tenant acts
at his peril by withholding rent for what he believes to be uninhabita-
ble premises if the landlord brings an unlawful detainer action. If
the court determines that the rented premises are even partially hab-
itable, and thus of some value, but the tenant has failed to pay any
rent or has paid rent in an amount less than the ascertained value
of the premises, then the landlord will prevail in the unlawful detainer
action. In the instant case, the court remanded the case to the trial
court with directions that the landlord should prevail in his unlawful
detainer action if the trial court should find the leased premises par-
tially habitable and of a value in excess of the rent paid in by the
tenant.
11. See Kline v. Burns, 111 N.H. 87, 276 A.2d 248 (1971); Lemle v. Bree-
den, 51 Hawaii 426, 462 P.2d 470 (1969). However, Boston Housing
Authority v. Hemingway, 293 N.E.2d 831 (Mass. 1973), Mease v. Fox,
200 N.W.2d 791 (Iowa 1972), and Jack Spring, Inc. v. Little, 50 Ill.
2d 351, 280 N.E.2d 208 (1972) can be read as creating a warranty
against latent defects as well as patent defects if the patent defects
are also housing code violations. See also Comment, Tenant Protec-
tion in Iowa-Mease v. Fox and the Implied Warranty of Habitability,
58 IowA L. REv. 656 (1973).
12. The rationale for holding that a waiver has occurred where the tenant
accepts patently defective premises appears to be predicated on the
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plied warranty of habitability parallels the treatment of the war-
ranties implied under the Uniform Commercial Code. Under the
Code,13 if a buyer inspects goods containing patent defects, but ac-
cepts the defective goods, he loses the protection of any implied war-
ranty with regard to the defects.14 It is submitted, however, that a
closer analysis of Foisy reveals that some parts of the court's opin-
ion are indeed meritorious.
The court predicated its "no-waiver" holding on three alterna-
tive grounds. First, the court held that an analysis of the Washing-
ton housing statute indicated it would be contrary to public policy
for a tenant to waive the implied warranty and thus relieve his
landlord of his statutory duty to provide tenants with habitable
premises. The court reasoned that the housing statute expressly
obligated every landlord to provide his tenants with habitable
premises.' 5 In addition, the landlord is obligated under the statute
to provide habitable premises regardless of any agreements be-
tween himself and his tenant.' 6 Therefore, to allow a landlord to
belief that responsible persons ought to be held liable for their irre-
sponsible acts. This is the view taken by the dissent in Foisy:
From that testimony it is perfectly clear that the defendant
was fully aware of the defects and deficiencies in the prem-
ises. Those defects and deficiencies were the very reason he
was willing and able to negotiate lower payments.
It requires no authority to sustain the proposition that a
person who takes possession of premises with known defects,
intends to repair those defects, bargains for reduced monthly
payments and characterizes the transaction as a "deal" which
he "grabbed," neither deserves nor needs the protection of an
implied warranty of habitability.
83 Wash. 2d at -, 515 P.2d at 169.
13. UNIFORm COMMECI CODE § 2-316(3) (b) provides:
(3) Notwithstanding subsection (2)
(b) When the buyer before entering into the contract
has examined the goods or the sample or model as
fully as he desired or has refused to examine the
goods there is no implied warranty with regard to
defects which an examination ought in the circum-
stances to have revealed to him;
14. Richards Mfg. Co. v. Gamel, 5 Wash. App. 549, 489 P.2d 366 (1971);
Fletcher Co. v. Melroe Mfg. Co., 238 So. 2d 142 (Fla. App. 1970);
Scotco, Inc. v. Dormeyer Indus., 402 F.2d 336 (7th Cir. 1968).
15. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 59.18.060 (1973) provides in part: The land-
lord will at all times during the tenancy keep the premises fit for hu-
man habitation ....
16. WASH. REv. CODE ANN. § 59.18.100(6) (1973) provides:
Nothing in this section shall prevent the tenant from agreeing
with the landlord to undertake the repairs himself in return
for cash payment or a reasonable reduction in rent, the agree-
ment thereof to be agreed upon between the parties, and such
agreement does not alter the landlord's obligations under this
chapter.
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fashion a private agreement removing his duty to provide habit-
-able premises would be to contradict the terms and purpose of the
statute.17
This rationale is sound and has been proffered by another
court.18 Moreover, the court's reasoning is supported by analogous
cases involving an employee's attempted waiver of industrial
safety statutes specifically imposing a duty on the employer.19
The court could have justified its "no-waiver" holding by rely-
ing solely on this construction of the state housing statute. How-
ever, the court further relied on two other independent grounds:
(1) that the purpose of the implied warranty and public policy pre-
vent a tenant such as Wyman from waiving the warranty and (2)
that the general societal ills created or aggravated by sub-standard
housing prohibit such a waiver.
The first additional independent justification offered by the
court for its "no-waiver" holding is that as between the two con-
tracting parties, the purpose of the implied warranty as well as
public policy prohibit a landlord from bargaining with his tenant
to accept patently sub-standard housing, even at a reduced monthly
rental.20 In view of the facts presented by Foisy, this reasoning is,
in part, questionable.
The analysis of this basis for the court's decision is aided by
viewing separately the two aspects of accepting patently defective
housing and of bargaining for -a rental reduction. Focusing solely
One of the obligations specifically imposed on the landlord under the
chapter is that he must, at all times, keep the rented premises fit for
human habitation. See note 15 supra.
17. Arguably, the Washington statute set forth in note 16 supra, which the
court relied upon in its analysis, can be read as expressly allowing a
landlord to remove by contract any duty of repair he might have with
respect to his tenants. The statute can fairly be construed to mean
that a private disclaimer will be binding between the parties, but that
a code violation will always subject the landlord to penal sanctions
through municipal enforcement.
18. See Javins v. First Nat'l Realty Co., 428 F.2d 1071 (D.C. Cir. 1970).
The language of the housing regulation involved in the Javins decision
is perhaps more susceptible of such a "no waiver" construction. It
provided that "[n]o person shall rent or offer to rent any habitation,
or the furnishings thereof, unless such habitation or its furnishings are
in a clean, safe and sanitary condition, in repair and free from rodents
or vermin." Id. at 1081.
19. See Narramore v. Cleveland, C., C. & St. L. Ry., 96 F. 298 (6th Cir.
1899). This analogy was emphasized by the Javins court to support
its holding that the statutory duty of providing habitable premises
cannot be waived.
20. 83 Wash. 2d at 22, 515 P.2d at 164.
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on a tenant's acceptance of patently defective housing, the court's
rationale is sound. One of the fundamental reasons for judicially
creating an implied warranty of habitability is that when a lower-
income urban tenant bargains with a landlord, the tenant is in a
grossly unequal position and cannot bargain for his own protec-
tion.2 1 The implied warranty of habitability is used to bridge the
gap between their respective bargaining positions and to imply into
the lease that protection which the tenant would normally have ex-
pressly demanded from the landlord had there truly been a situa-
tion with equal bargaining power. In view of this basic reason for
the emergence of the warranty, it appears that even though the
housing defects are patent, if there is a gross inequality in the bar-
gaining power of the two parties, then a tenant's acceptance of the
patently defective premises should not constitute a "waiver" of the
implied warranty.22 If a tenant had the requisite bargaining power,
he would always demand that the landlord repair the premises be-
fore he would accept them.23 Moreover, there is persuasive author-
ity for the proposition that courts should and will interfere with the
oppressive terms contained in a contract executed between two pri-
vate parties where the oppressed party is in a grossly inferior bar-
gaining position or where the transaction is so one-sided as to be
regarded as unconscionable. 24
Turning to the rental reduction aspect of this basis for the deci-
sion, the court's reasoning becomes questionable. If the court is
saying that it will not find a waiver of the implied warranty where
there is unequal bargaining power and the landlord gives the ten-
ant only a nominal reduction in rent (i.e., an amount not adequate
to allow the tenant actually to make the necessary repairs him-
self), then its conclusion is sound. The essential goal sought to be
21. See Green v. Superior Court, 10 Cal. 3d 616, 517 P.2d 1168, 111 Cal.
Rptr. 704 (1974); Mease v. Fox, 200 N.W.2d 791 (Iowa 1972); Javins
v. First Nat'l Realty Co., 428 F.2d 1071 (D.C. Cir. 1970).
22. Indeed, "waiver" is defined as the voluntary relinquishment of a
known right. Farmers State Bank v. Edison Non-Stock Co-op Ass'n,
190 Neb. 789, 212 N.W.2d 625 (1973). There is no element of volun-
tariness where the tenant is in a grossly unequal bargaining position
with his landlord.
23. It is somewhat surprising that the court referred to Wyman (the ten-
ant) in terms of being a "disadvantaged tenant," implying that he was,
in fact, in a grossly inferior bargaining position with Foisy (his land-
lord). The facts of the case indicate that Wyman was not in an infe-
rior bargaining position, for he successfully negotiated a reduction in
the monthly rent from $87 to $50 a month.
24. See Jones v. Star Credit Corp., 59 Misc. 2d 189, 298 N.Y.S.2d 264
(1969); Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc., 32 N.J. 358, 161 A.2d
69 (1960).
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effectuated by the use of an implied warranty is to place the prem-
ises in a fit condition for the tenant and his family. Hence, even if
there is a reduction in rent, if the reduction does not actually give
the tenant the economic ability to repair the defects, then this goal
is not being reached and the tenant should not be deemed to have
waived the implied warranty. In such a case, the rent reduction
serves only partially to appease the tenant for living in such mis-
ery.
If, on the other hand, the court is saying that there will be no
waiver even in situations where the landlord substantially reduces
the monthly rent, and thus provides the tenant with the economic
ability to make the necessary repairs, then the court's holding is un-
sound. If the rent reduction will, in fact, allow the tenant to repair
the defects, then the purpose of the warranty is being attained and
the tenant should be -barred from subsequently suing on any im-
plied warranty of habitability or even using it as a defense in an
unlawful detainer action brought by the landlord. The tenant
would have had an opportunity to make the premises habitable and
should be held accountable for his own failure to repair.25 Such
an approach is also desirable because if the repairs come indirectly
out of the tenant's own pocket, he may be more likely to respect the
landlord's property and not destroy it.
The second independent ground for the court's determination
that the tenant had not waived the implied warranty centered on
the societal interest affected by the rental of sub-standard housing.
The court reasoned that when a sub-standard dwelling is rented
to a tenant, society is harmed because the community is continu-
ously exposed to the tenant, who must live in unhealthy conditions
and who may ,become a carrier of disease contracted during his
occupancy of the premises. Moreover, the court noted that sub-
standard housing conditions are at least a contributing cause of ju-
venile delinquency.2 6 As a result, even if a tenant intends to waive
his implied warranty, and even if he accepts the premises at a re-
duced rent, society, in general, is nonetheless harmed by this "pri-
25. Such an approach would admittedly require the court to make a num-
ber of "full-blown" factual determinations even where the landlord
brings a summary unlawful detainer action. However, while an un-
lawful detainer action is intended to be a summary procedure whereby
the narrow issue of the right to possession can be quickly determined,
the implied warranty of habitability and its waiver by the tenant do
relate directly to the issue of possession, and the tenant should be per-
mitted to raise them. Because these factual determinations relate di-
rectly to the issue of whether a waiver has taken place, they should
be allowed into evidence.
26. 83 Wash. 2d at -, 515 P.2d at 164-65.
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vate" transaction. As a matter of public policy, therefore, no ten-
ant will be able to waive the implied warranty of habitability. A
tenant will thus be able to sue on the implied warranty or use it as
a defense and thereby force the landlord to repair the premises, re-
gardless of what the lease provides.
The court implicitly focuses on the two fundamental competing
policy considerations. On one hand, a traditional tenet of Anglo-
American law is that a progressive society has an interest in allow-
ing parties to contract privately -and mold their respective rights
and duties without judicial interferenceYt  On the other hand,
where the provisions of a private transaction detrimentally effect
the public good, then society, through the judicial system, has a
right to modify or void .private contractual terms to protect the
community's interest.28 The Foisy court found that the practice of
renting uninhabitable premises does detrimentally affect the pub-
lic good and therefore justifies judicial intervention.
Two problems arise with the court's rationale. First, Foisy
stands for the proposition that courts can and should step in and
judicially modify or avoid these private agreements where some
degree of public detriment can be shown, then it is indeed setting a
startling precedent. It is submitted that courts should interfere
with private agreements only where the public injury is both sub-
stantial -and sharply defined, and that Foisy must be read in this
context. It is also submitted that in the urban rental situation, this
type of societal injury does exist because of the renting of tumble-
down houses, and judicial interference with these private lease
agreements is justified.
Second, if a tenant agrees to rent defective premises in return for
a substantial reduction in monthly rent and further expressly
promises in the lease to use the reduction to repair the defective
premises, then it appears that no injury accrues to society and the
tenant should not be able to sue on the implied warranty of habit-
ability or be able to use it as a defense. On the contrary, such a
lease arrangement only serves to effectuate the ultimate societal
goal in this difficult area-a minimum standard of decent hous-
ing.29
27. See Williston, Freedom to Contract, 6 COaNELL L.Q. 365 (1921).
28. Courts keep in mind the principle that the best interests of
society demand that persons should not be unnecessarily
restricted in their freedom to contract. But they do not
hesitate to declare void as against public policy contractual
provisions which clearly tend to the injury of the public in
some way.
Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc., 32 N.J. 358, 403-04, 161 A.2d
69, 95 (1960).
29. The importance of having the tenant expressly covenant in the lease
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CONCLUSION
The urban landlord-tenant situation presents a multitude of
very difficult legal and practical problems. The Foisy court should
be complimented for stepping forward and attempting to make
some much-needed fresh judicial inroads into solving some of these
problems.30 The court should, however, be criticized for a less than
complete analysis of the three alternative approaches it proffered
regarding the waiver of an implied warranty of habitability. Al-
though the court adequately covered the statutory approach to the
waiver issue, it only summarily handled the other two alternative
approaches. This criticism is especially well-leveled when one real-
izes that Foisy will undoubtedly be cited for the bold proposition
that in no event can a tenant waive the implied warranty of habit-
ability owed to him ,by his landlord. Further, it is submitted that
the court should have fashioned a case ,by case approach to the
waiver issue, weighing factors such as (1) the equality in bargain-
ing power between the two parties, (2) whether the monthly rent
reduction (if any) is substantial enough to allow the tenant to make
the necessary repairs himself and (3) whether the tenant expressly
that the specified rent reduction will be used to repair the premises
is that it affords the landlord the ability to enforce the repair agree-
ment and thus bring the premises up to a minimum level of habitabil-
ity.
30. It is submitted that judicial inroads into the urban housing problem
are presently needed in many instances because while traditional
housing codes have been enacted to solve the problems of ensuring
a minimum level of decent housing by requiring the owner-landlord
to make repairs, experience has demonstrated that these codes have
been less than successful. First, compliance with these traditional
codes has been predicated largely on criminal sanctions and has not
afforded the tenant a civil right of action to enforce the codes. These
criminal sanctions, however, have simply not been enforced on a major
scale by local authorities. Second, the volume of housing code com-
plaints, coupled with the substantial amount of administrative red tape
involved, have added to the lack of enforcement. Gribetz & Grad,
Housing Code Enforcement: Sanctions and Remedies, 66 COL!M. L.
REv. 1254 (1966). Quinn & Phillips, The Law of Landlord-Tenant: A
Critical Evaluation of the Past With Guidelines For the Future, 38
FoRDHAm L. Ruv. 225 (1969).
With the enactment of modern landlord-tenant 'acts, such as the
Uniform Residential Landlord-Tenant Act recently adopted in Ne-
braska, the necessity for judicial solutions to these problems is greatly
lessened if not eliminated. This result is largely due to the fact that
under the Uniform Act, the tenant himself plays a major role in the
enforcement of the housing code. Thus, its provisions will actually
be implemented to a much greater degree.
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promises to make the necessary repairs in return for the rent re-
duction. While a case by case approach to the waiver issue appears
to be the most equitable and reasonable, it must be noted that
such an approach does not engender a very high degree of predicta-
bility. A landlord is essentially kept guessing as to what degree of
a reduction in rent will be deemed substantial enough to equip
his tenant with the economic ability to repair the defects and thus
preclude the tenant from subsequently asserting an implied war-
ranty as the basis of a suit against the landlord, or using the war-
ranty as a defense in an unlawful detainer action for non-payment
of rent. A tenant is also put in a precarious position should he de-
cide to withhold rent in an amount sufficient to enable him to make
necessary repairs. If the tenant withholds an amount which would
cause his rent payment to fall below the market value of the
premises, he would be subject to an eviction in unlawful detainer
action.31
Timothy J. McDermott '75
31. For a discussion of this problem in the context of the Foisy case, see
note 8 supra.
